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The Integrity of Financial Analysts: Evidence from Asymmetric 
Responses to Earnings Surprises  
 
 
 
 
 
	Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the integrity of financial analysts by examining their 
recommendation responses to large quarterly earnings surprises. Although there is no 
significant difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts in response to positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are more reluctant 
than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade stock recommendations in response to negative 
earnings surprises. The evidence implies that conflicts of interest undermine the integrity 
of financial analysts. We further examine the effects of reputation concern and the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement as informal and formal mechanisms, on restoring analysts’ 
integrity. The results show that the positive bias in recommendations remains prevalent 
for affiliated analysts from reputable investment banks and for the post-reform period. 
Finally, evidence from market reactions suggests that investors fail to notice that 
analysts’ integrity is compromised by conflicts of interest and are misled by affiliated 
analysts.   
 
 		
JEL classification: G10, G24, G02 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial analysts provide professional expertise and communication channels for 
both managers and investors. Their role in protecting investors and ensuring investor 
well-being in capital markets has received increasing attention from investors, regulators, 
and researchers. As important participants in the stock market, analysts collect and 
analyze firm financial information and other publicly available information, forecast 
revenues and earnings, and issue stock recommendations. The information and 
recommendations contained in analyst reports help investors to identify investment 
opportunities and risks. Previous studies have generally concluded that analysts provide 
valuable information that enhances market efficiency (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Brown, 
2000). They also serve as whistleblowers on corporate fraud, accounting for 16.9% of 
fraud detection (Dyck et al., 2010), and deter managers from engaging in opportunistic 
behavior, thereby decreasing earnings management, corporate fraud, and the modification 
of audit opinions (Yu, 2008; Chen et al., 2014 and 2015ab).  
However, a number of studies have raised concerns about the integrity of 
financial analysts in capital markets. Jensen (2011) defines analysts with integrity as 
those who keep their word, i.e., honor their commitments and fulfil their promises on 
time, and who are honest and straightforward. Using data collected by a mail survey of 
security analysts, Veit and Murphy (1996) document that approximately 25% of the 
analysts in the sample had experienced or observed unethical behavior by a colleague, 
such as a lack of diligence and thoroughness in making recommendations, or writing 
reports with predetermined conclusions. Cote and Goodstein (1999) question the ethics of 
analysts’ practice of withholding their private opinions, and argue that analysts’ herding 
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behavior has long-term ramifications for the efficient pricing of securities and the 
preservation of public trust in the financial services industry. Other studies show that 
conflicts of interest reduce analysts’ integrity, as reflected in biased recommendations 
(Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O’Brien et al., 2005; Palazzo 
and Rethel, 2008; Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015). In the Financial 
Market Integrity Outlook Survey conducted by the CFA Institute in 2011, financial 
advisors in the global markets received a score of only 3 out of a possible 5 for integrity. 
Financial advisory services are considered to have the most serious ethical issues.1  
The aim of this study is to shed further light on the topical yet under-researched 
issue of the integrity of financial analysts by taking earnings surprises into account to 
investigate how conflicts of interest determine analysts’ recommendation responses. We 
also examine the effectiveness of informal (reputation concern) and formal mechanisms 
(the Global Research Analyst Settlement of 2003, hereafter the Global Settlement) in 
restoring their integrity, and explore whether the market recognizes the systematic bias 
caused by the reduced integrity of financial analysts.  
Conflicts of interest may arise when sell-side analysts, who are employed by 
investment banks or brokerage firms,2 are under pressure from their employers (i.e., 
investment banks) to produce favorable research reports either to maintain relationships 
with current investment banking clients or to attract such clients. Underwriting equity or 
bond offerings is an important revenue source for investment banks, and optimistic 
reports may encourage clients to buy securities and increase brokerage commissions (e.g., 
                                                   
1 Source: the CFA Institute Financial Market Integrity Outlook Survey 
(http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/topics/Pages/financial_market_integrity_index.aspx). 
2 In contrast, buy-side analysts are employed by pension-fund or mutual-fund companies and manage 
money on behalf of their clients. These analysts research stocks and make recommendations to the funds’ 
financial managers. Conflicts of interest are generally of less concern among buy-side analysts.  
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Cowen et al., 2006). Analysts also have an incentive to maintain good relationships with 
the managers of the firms they follow, as management provides an important information 
source (e.g., Francis et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998). Analysts employed by a merger and 
acquisition (M&A) advisor also tend to make optimistic recommendation revisions over a 
180-day period surrounding the M&A announcement (e.g. Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008; 
Wu et al., 2015). Sell-side analysts, regarded as affiliated analysts, are subject to more 
conflicts of interest than unaffiliated analysts whose employers have no investment 
banking relationships with the firms they follow.  
We extend the studies of analyst optimism by focusing on analysts’ responses to 
earnings surprises, which represent important new information released to the market.3 
We argue that conflicts of interest may impede affiliated analysts from incorporating 
negative earnings surprises in their recommendations. Large negative earnings surprises 
usually indicate a firm’s unexpected financial deterioration, and are a red flag to 
investors, alerting observant analysts to the need to revise their earnings forecasts and 
recommendations (Brown and Rozzeff, 1979; Stickel, 1989). 4  A set of firms with 
earnings surprises thus provides an interesting context in which to investigate analysts’ 
recommendation changes and any possible bias involved in these changes. While large 
positive earnings surprises represent good news for the market and for both affiliated and 
                                                   
3 Prior studies report that large earnings surprises, particularly large negative earnings surprises, are costly 
to firms (e.g., Mikhail et al., 2004; Doyle et al., 2006; Ng, 2007). Managers are thus motivated to avoid 
large negative earnings surprises and report earnings that are consistent with market expectations (e.g., 
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002). Firms facing large negative earnings surprises are also 
more likely to make discretionary disclosures to warn investors about disappointing earnings (Kasznik and 
Lev, 1995). 
4 In comparison with earnings that meet or marginally exceed analysts’ expectations, which many 
researchers interpret as the outcome of earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Hayn, 
1995), large positive earnings surprises are less likely to be the result of managers’ earnings manipulation. 
Likewise, large negative earnings surprises are less likely to be the result of firms’ use of the “big bath” 
technique. Large negative earnings surprises may be interpreted as an indication of a firm’s financial 
distress because it is relatively difficult for management to boost earnings through earnings management to 
an extent that they can substantially meet analysts’ earnings expectations.  
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unaffiliated analysts, large negative earnings surprises make conflicts of interest more 
severe for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts.  
In the absence of conflicts of interest, we expect to observe a symmetric pattern in 
the recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following both 
positive and negative earnings surprises. However, when conflicts of interest deteriorate 
integrity, the responses of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to large positive and 
negative earnings surprises are expected to be asymmetric. More specifically, we do not 
expect to observe any significant difference in recommendation changes between 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large positive earnings surprises, whereas 
following large negative earnings surprises, affiliated analysts with conflicts of interest 
are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their stock recommendations.  
We analyze 52,862 firm-quarter-analyst observations from the 1994 to 2005 
period on 7,568 large quarterly earnings surprises (4,591 positive and 2,977 negative) 
reported by firms publicly listed in the U.S. The results confirm our expectations. We 
find that in response to large positive earnings surprises, there is no significant difference 
in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts – they both 
upgrade their stock recommendations in a similar way to reflect the favorable information 
content of large positive earnings surprises. In response to large negative earnings 
surprises, however, affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to 
downgrade stocks. The reluctance of affiliated analysts to issue negative 
recommendations (in the form of stock downgrades) to investment banking clients 
provides evidence of the violation of integrity when conflicts of interest occur.   
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We proceed to examine whether informal and formal disciplinary mechanisms 
can be used to enhance the integrity of financial analysts. As a good reputation in capital 
markets can provide financial intermediaries with benefits such as perceived credibility 
and trustworthiness, which are critical to their success in attracting clients, we argue that 
reputation concern may be an informal mechanism motivating unbiased 
recommendations. More prestigious investment banks have greater reputation concern as 
they have more to lose, are more visible in the market, and are thus subject to more 
public scrutiny. Therefore, we attempt to determine whether patterns of responses to 
positive and negative earnings surprises are different among analysts from prestigious 
investment banks. The results show that analysts at prestigious investment banks do not 
behave differently from analysts at less prestigious banks, implying that reputation 
concern fails to enhance integrity by promoting independent and unbiased 
recommendations. This is in line with Fang and Yasuda’s (2009) finding that a bank’s 
reputation concern does not offset the effects of conflicts of interest.  
The formal mechanism for restoring analysts’ integrity examined in this study is 
the Global Settlement. Aimed to mitigate analysts’ conflicts of interest, this reform 
explicitly prohibits the tying of analysts’ compensation to investment banking business, 
and requires investment banks to prevent internal communication and interaction that 
could lead to conflicts of interest by separating their securities underwriting departments 
from their stock research departments using “Chinese walls” or other information 
barriers. 5  We attempt to determine whether the Global Settlement reduces analysts’ 
conflicts of interest and encourages analysts to issue unbiased recommendations. Our 
                                                   
5 See the news release by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.  
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results show that the positive bias in recommendations remains prevalent after the 
introduction of the Global Settlement. In line with Boni’s (2005) finding that regulatory 
reform is incapable of eliminating positively biased recommendations, our results enrich 
the studies of the Global Settlement. Wu et al. (2015) document that the benefits of the 
reform is only limited to the reduction of optimism estimated over a 180-day period 
surrounding the M&A announcement. When the optimism is estimated in the 90-day 
period prior to the announcement, the impact is no longer effective. It is worth noting that 
biased recommendation during this period is more likely to mislead investors because the 
market has not yet known whether the analyst’s brokerage had won an advisory contract 
with the “to be announced” acquirer. Likewise, Boni and Womack (2003) suggest that 
although the new rules encourage more independent research, financial analysts may still 
be under pressure to issue positively biased reports to retain their relationships with the 
managers of client firms.6  
Finally, we examine the extent to which investors are aware of the compromised 
integrity posed by conflicts of interest by examining the market reactions to 
recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. As affiliated 
analysts are more likely to be biased, investors should regard unaffiliated analysts as 
more credible (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). However, the 
results show that investors do not react differently to recommendation changes issued by 
                                                   
6 According to The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 11, 2014), Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and eight other 
investment banks were collectively fined $43.5 million by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in 
2014. The banks were accused of offering favorable stock research reports to attract underwriting business 
in an initial public offering by Toys ’R’ Us. This case suggests that conflicts of interest remain to be an 
issue for some investment banks.  
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affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, suggesting that investors fail to recognize integrity 
risks and are misled by positively biased recommendations made by affiliated analysts.  
This study contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we extend the 
literature on the integrity of financial analysts by examining whether they adjust their 
recommendations when firm earnings are inconsistent with their predictions. While the 
literature focuses on recommendation optimism in general without taking earnings 
surprises into account, we examine analysts’ reactions when they are proved wrong, a 
circumstance in which analysts’ conflicts of interest become a salient issue. We provide 
original evidence of the positively biased changes in recommendations made by sell-side 
analysts in response to large quarterly earnings surprises. The results indicate that 
analysts’ private interests may take precedence over their obligation to provide accurate 
recommendations i.e., conflicts of interest undermines the integrity of financial analysts.7  
Second, we add to the literature on the ethical implications of reputation by 
examining the role of the reputation concern of investment banks in mitigating conflicts 
of interest (i.e., Carter and Manaster, 1990; Fang, 2005). Our findings show that the 
effectiveness of reputation as an informal disciplinary mechanism to mitigate the self-
interest of financial analysts is essentially limited.  
Third, our study enriches the growing literature on the Global Settlement (i.e., 
Kadan, et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2015) by examining the extent to 
which the reform promotes independent and unbiased recommendations. The findings 
show that the reform has failed to restore the integrity of financial analysts, as the 
recommendations made by affiliated analysts continue to be positively biased. The results 
                                                   
7 The CFA Institute, a global association of professional financial analysts, recently published a Code of 
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct (effective from July 1, 2014), which defines principles that 
help analysts to manage their conflicts of interest.  
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are broadly in line with the literature which concludes that the impact of the reform is 
rather limited, at least not as effective as hoped by regulators. Further actions should be 
taken and policies introduced to cultivate analysts’ moral resolution and integrity. 
Investors should also be made aware of the compromise of financial analysts’ integrity as 
reflected in their positively biased recommendations. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. We provide a motivating 
example in the next section. In Section 3, we review the relevant literature and develop 
our hypotheses. We report the data and research design in Section 4, and the empirical 
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. A Motivating Example 
 
We consider the example of New Century Financial Corporation, a subprime 
mortgage lender delisted on March 13, 2007 when the price of its stocks fell to $0.67 
(from $51.97 in May 2006). As illustrated in Appendix A, the firm reported a negative 
earnings surprise of 41% in the third quarter of 2006, following an initial negative 
surprise of 2% in the previous quarter. Despite this large earnings surprise, analysts 
continued to issue optimistic recommendations. Of the 10 ratings given within the month 
after the firm’s earnings surprise announcement in the third quarter of 2006, two were 
“strong buy,” five were “buy,” two were “hold,” and only one was “sell.” Analysts 
remained relatively optimistic about the stock until as little as one week before the 
delisting; the 12 recommendations issued that week still included one “buy” rating and 
seven “hold” ratings. The consensus recommendation level was 3.4 (equivalent to a 
“strong hold” rating), despite a sharp decline in the firm’s stock price due to massive 
publicized mortgage losses. Further examination reveals that two investment banks 
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underwrote the firm’s securities issuances by $100 million in 2006. None of the analysts 
from these investment banks issued a “sell” rating for the stock.8  
This example clearly shows how analysts’ responses to a firm’s earnings surprises 
may be compromised by incentives related to maintaining or creating underwriting 
relationships—perhaps to generate more revenue by underwriting a firm’s securities in 
the future.9 The example motivates us to examine analysts’ responses to important news 
events—namely large earnings surprises—when updating their stock recommendations in 
the presence of conflicts of interest.  
 
3.    Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses	
3.1. Analyst recommendations and positive earnings surprises 
 
Financial analysts respond promptly to new information, and their stock reports 
and information dissemination promote market efficiency by helping investors to more 
accurately value companies (Schipper, 1991; Brown, 2000). Brown and Rozzeff (1979) 
find that analysts revise their forecasts in response to new information by decreasing 
(increasing) their quarterly earnings forecasts in response to previous high (low) 
predictions. Stickel (1989) reports that revisions increase following earnings 
announcements because analysts reevaluate a firm’s stock after new earnings information 
is published. Large earnings surprises represent important information. Analysts are 
expected by both investment banks and investors to update their valuations subsequent to 
quarterly earnings announcements to help investors to process the new information.  
                                                   
8  We collected analysts’ recommendation ratings and earnings surprises from Yahoo! Finance 
(http://finance.yahoo.com). The information on the firm’s securities issuance was drawn from its 2006 10Q 
form. 
9 Responses may also be compromised merely by analysts’ ignorance or lack of research. We indirectly 
investigate these possibilities by adding analyst experience as a control variable in our regression analysis. 
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Large positive earnings surprises represent good news for the market and for both 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, and do not induce conflicts of interest. As a result, we 
expect to observe similar pattern of changes in the recommendations of affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts following large positive earnings surprises. That is, both affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts are expected to upgrade their recommendations in the same way 
to reflect the favorite information content of large positive earnings surprises. We 
develop our first hypothesis as follows.  
H1: There is no significant difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ 
responses to positive earnings surprises. 
3.2. Analyst recommendations and negative earnings surprises 
 
When firms report large negative earnings surprises, conflicts of interest become 
more pronounced for affiliated analysts, because unfavorable changes to their stock 
recommendations may reduce commissions and harm their business relationships with 
investment banking clients. Large negative earnings surprises therefore induce more 
conflicts of interest for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated analysts, as the latter are more 
independent.  
Although sell-side analysts are professionally obliged to make downward forecast 
revisions and downgrade stocks to maintain forecast accuracy in response to negative 
surprises, pressure from investment banks to write favorable reports to maintain or create 
underwriting relationships may take precedence over their integrity, leading to a positive 
bias in the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations made by affiliated financial 
analysts. Therefore, we expect to observe differences in the patterns of recommendation 
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changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts in response to large negative 
earnings surprises, as stated in our second hypothesis below. 
H2: Affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade 
stock recommendations subsequent to negative earnings surprises.  
3.3. Financial analysts and reputation concern 
 
Reputation is a critical source of material benefits for investment banks. Studies 
of the relation between investment banks’ reputation and performance in initial public 
offerings (IPOs) show that the IPOs contracted by more prestigious underwriters are 
associated with short-term (e.g., Logue, 1973; Tinic, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990) 
and long-term (Carter et al., 1998) outperformance. Similar findings are reported for the 
bond market. Fang (2005) shows that prestigious banks obtain lower bond yields and 
charge higher fees. Kim et al. (2005) show that clients are willing to pay higher loan rates 
to borrow from banks with better reputations. As a result, investment banks—especially 
prestigious banks, which are under great public scrutiny—have strong incentives to build 
and protect their reputation as financial intermediaries. Biased recommendations from 
financial analysts at prestigious investment banks could mislead investors and jeopardize 
the banks’ perceived credibility and trustworthiness. Therefore, we regard reputation as 
an informal mechanism for enhancing the integrity of financial analysts and expect 
reputation concern to motivate investment banks to encourage their analysts to engage in 
independent and high-quality stock research, thereby mitigating analysts’ conflicts of 
interest. We propose the following hypothesis in relation to reputation.  
H3: The asymmetric responses of affiliated financial analysts are mitigated by 
reputation concern.  
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3.4. Financial analysts and regulatory reform 
 
The Global Settlement was an enforcement agreement reached in 2003 by the 
SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), the New York State Attorney General’s Office, and 10 of the largest 
investment banks in the US. The main purpose of the agreement was to reduce analysts’ 
conflicts of interest and enhance their integrity. Together with Rule 2711, previously 
issued by the NASD, and the NYSE’s amended Rule 472, the Global Settlement 
explicitly prohibits the tying of analysts’ compensation to investment banking business, 
and requires every investment bank to prevent internal communication and interaction 
that could lead to conflicts of interest by separating its underwriting department from its 
stock-analysis department with a “Chinese wall” or other information barrier.  
Several recent studies have investigated the effects of the Global Settlement on 
the research conducted by sell-side analysts, but their results are not conclusive. Kadan et 
al. (2009) find that optimistic recommendations have been less frequent and more 
informative since the regulations, and pessimistic or neutral recommendations have been 
more frequent and less informative. Clarke et al. (2009) report that since the Global 
Settlement, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts have been less likely to issue “strong 
buy” recommendations. However, Boni (2005) reports that analysts have been even more 
optimistic since the Global Settlement, providing evidence that the number of high 
recommendations has remained constant and the number of low recommendations has 
decreased. As the aim of the Global Settlement is to reduce analysts’ conflicts of interest, 
our final hypothesis is stated as follows:  
 14 
H4: The asymmetric responses of affiliated financial analysts have been mitigated 
by the Global Settlement and other relevant rules. 
 
4.   Methodology and Data 
4.1. Sample and variables  
We measure earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts. Earnings surprises are 
defined as the International Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) actual earnings per share 
for quarter q minus the most recent I/B/E/S median earnings forecast preceding the 
earnings announcement date (EAD), scaled by the absolute value of analysts’ median 
forecasts.10 We estimate analyst median forecasts based on the I/B/E/S Detail History file 
and use them as consensus forecasts, as medians are less sensitive than means to outliers. 
We select the most recent consensus earnings forecast before an earnings announcement 
because previous studies report that recent forecasts are more accurate (e.g., O’Brien, 
1988). 
Consistent with Doyle et al. (2006), we use decile portfolios to classify large 
quarterly earnings surprises as either positive or negative. We begin by sorting the 
earnings surprises into two groups: a positive group (including zero surprises) and a 
negative group. We then sort each group into deciles based on the magnitude of the 
earnings surprises in that quarter. An earnings surprise is classified as a large positive 
                                                   
10 Previous researchers also scale the difference between I/B/E/S earnings per share and analysts’ consensus 
earnings forecasts by assets per share (Core et al., 2006), the standard deviation of earnings forecasts 
(Mendenhall, 2003), and market price per share at the beginning (or end) of quarter q (Franzoni and Marin, 
2006). We use each of these measures of earnings surprises in our robustness checks and obtain similar 
results. Another measure of earnings surprises is standardized unexpected earnings. This measure is 
predicated on the assumption that earnings follow a seasonal random walk model with a drift, and is 
commonly used in the literature on post-earnings-announcement drift. However, as the focus of the current 
study is analysts’ reactions to unexpected earnings, we measure earnings surprises relative to analysts’ 
forecasts rather than using a time-series model of firms’ prior earnings. 
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earnings surprise if it is classified in decile 8, 9, or 10 in the positive group. An earnings 
surprise is classified as a large negative earnings surprise if it is classified in decile 1, 2, 
or 3 in the negative group.11 Moderate earnings surprises (deciles 4, 5, 6, and 7 in both 
the positive group and the negative groups) comprise our control groups. Large positive 
(negative) earnings surprises indicate that a firm’s reported earnings are well above 
(below) analysts’ consensus expectations and generally represent good (bad) news about 
the firm for investors.  
We define an affiliated analyst as an analyst whose employer has an investment 
banking relationship with the firm recommended by the analyst. We obtain the identity of 
the underwriter of every IPO, seasoned equity offering (SEO), and bond offering from the 
New Issues Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). We obtain information on 
the investment bankers for target and acquirer companies from the Thomson Financial 
SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database. Consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999), we identify an 
analyst as affiliated if her brokerage firm (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the 
recommended stock in the past 5 years; (2) was the underwriter of an SEO or bond 
offering of the recommended stock in the past 2 years;12 or (3) advised on an M&A deal 
made by the firm with the recommended stock in the past 3 years. We use the I/B/E/S 
Broker Code Key to combine the recommendation data with the SDC investment banking 
data.  
                                                   
11 In simple terms, we focus on the 30% of earnings surprises with the largest absolute values. 
12 Conrad et al. (2006) assume that an investment banking relationship exists if any debt, IPO, SEO, or 
M&A transaction is conducted by the analysts’ firm at any time during the sample period. We repeat our 
tests using this definition of affiliated analysts and obtain results similar to those presented here. 
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4.2. Regression models 
 
Two dates are considered important in this study: quarterly EAD and analysts’ 
recommendation report date. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of events. We begin by 
identifying a firm’s EAD for quarter q from the I/B/E/S Detail History file. We take the 
most recent recommendation before the quarter q EAD as the recommendation before the 
earnings announcement, or RECbefore. 13  We then take the very first (earliest) 
recommendation subsequent to the earnings announcement for quarter q (RECafter) to 
examine the analysts’ recommendation changes in response to earnings surprises reported 
in quarter q (RECafter – RECbefore). We also make sure this recommendation (RECafter) is 
issued prior to quarter q+1 EAD. 14  
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
We are particularly interested in whether affiliated analysts with conflicts of 
interest react to large earnings surprises in a significantly different way from unaffiliated 
analysts. Consistent with Kolasinksi and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015), we use an 
ordered logit model to test our hypotheses. The regression model is constructed as 
follows. 
                                                   
13 As presented in Figure 1, this recommendation may be made either after the firm’s quarter q fiscal period 
(illustrated by a solid line) or during the quarter q fiscal period (illustrated by a dotted line). We make sure 
that this recommendation is before the next quarterly EAD.   
14 Unlike some prior studies, we select the earliest stock report following the earnings announcement for 
quarter q rather than the most recent forecast report for the next quarter, q+1, for the following reasons. 
First, approximately 26.9% of the recommendations in our sample are made within 7 trading days (i.e., the 
EAD plus the next 6 trading days) of the firms’ announcements of their quarterly earnings news. Another 
37.2% of the recommendations are made between the next 8th and 15th trading days. Collectively, more than 
60% of the recommendations are made within 15 trading days of the EAD.  Therefore, the earliest report 
reflects analysts’ immediate response to the arrival of new information and is most relevant to our study. 
Second, forecast immediacy, or the speed with which analysts respond to a significant change in publicly 
available information, is positively related to forecast usefulness (Mozes, 2003). Third, as the focus of this 
study is analysts’ responses to large earnings surprises reported in the previous quarter, we need to control 
for changes made to analysts’ recommendations in response to important firm information other than 
quarterly earnings announcements. Using the earliest forecast report minimizes the effects of other 
information on analysts’ recommendation changes in the time window between large earnings surprises and 
subsequent analysts’ recommendation changes.  
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UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 (SURPRISE×AFFIL)  
+β4MEANREC+ β5LREC+ β6ABRET+ β7EXP+ β8BRKSZ 
+β9LOGMKV+β10INST+ε                                                   (1) 
 
Stock recommendations in the I/B/E/S dataset are subject to standardized coding 
with assigned numerical values (1 = “strong buy,” 2 = “buy,” 3 = “hold,” 4 = 
“underperform,” and 5 = “sell”). Consistent with the literature (e.g., Clarke et al., 2006), 
we reverse the ordering so that larger numbers indicate more positive recommendations. 
Following Kadan et al. (2009), Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), and Wu et al. (2015), we 
define the dependent variable, the recommendation changes UPGRADE, according to 
whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In particular, 
UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation 
change is an upgrade in response to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does 
not change; and -1 if a recommendation change is a downgrade. We do not use the raw 
change in recommendation levels based on the I/B/E/S’s 5-tier coding system (-4, -3, -2, 
… 2, 3, 4) as the dependent variable because some brokerages use a 3-tier 
recommendation system, and thus the level of recommendation changes are not 
comparable between brokerages.15  
We define AFFIL as a dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst’s brokerage shares 
an investment banking relationship with the firm for which the recommendation is issued, 
and 0 otherwise. SURPRISE×AFFIL is the interaction term between SURPRISE and 
AFFIL. The coefficient of the interaction item SURPRISE×AFFIL is a measure of 
                                                   
15 In particular, as discussed by Kadan et al. (2009), Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), and Wu et al. (2015), 
not all brokerages use a 5-tier recommendation system. Prior to the Global Settlement, about 17% of 
recommendations were issued using a 3-tier (buy/hold/sell) system, and this proportion rose to over 75% 
following the Global Settlement. Although I/B/E/S has coded the recommendation levels at a 5-tier system, 
the calculated changes in recommendation levels across brokerages and analysts using different tier-
systems are not comparable. We are grateful to one of the referees for sharing the insight regarding this 
issue.  
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whether affiliated and unaffiliated analysts respond differently to large earnings surprises. 
Other independent variables are defined as follows. 
SURPRISE:  Firm earnings surprise, defined as the I/B/E/S actual 
earnings per share minus the most recent I/B/E/S median 
earnings forecast preceding the EAD, scaled by the 
absolute value of analysts’ median forecasts. We estimate 
median forecasts based on the Detail History file.  
MEANREC:  Average recommendation changes for a firm 5 days before 
a recommendation change.  
LREC: Previous recommendation level before a recommendation 
change. 
ABRET: 10-day cumulative average abnormal returns (market-
adjusted model) for a firm before a recommendation 
change. 
EXP: Analyst experience, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 
plus the number of prior quarters in which an analyst has 
issued an earnings-forecast report for the firm.16 
BRKSZ: Size of a brokerage house, measured as the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts employed by the 
brokerage house. 
LOGMKV: Firm size, measured as the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of firm equity. 
INST: Institution ownership, measured as the percentage of a 
firm’s total outstanding shares held by institutional 
investors. 
 
Our first hypothesis states that there is no significant difference between affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts’ responses to large positive earnings surprises. If this hypothesis 
holds, we expect that β3 = 0 for the positive earnings surprise sample.  
The second hypothesis concerns analysts’ conflicts of interest: although both 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts tend to make recommendation changes in a same way 
following large positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are less likely than 
unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their stock recommendations following large negative 
                                                   
16 A shortcoming of this measure of analyst experience is that it does not accommodate analysts’ research 
reports before October 1993, the first month for which I/B/E/S recommendation data are available. An 
alternative measure is to count analysts’ research reports only after a specific year (e.g., 1995). We use this 
measure as a robustness check and obtain similar results on this issue. 
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earnings surprises. We estimate the preceding equation using the large negative earnings 
surprises. If the second hypothesis holds, we expect that β3 < 0 for the negative earnings 
surprise sample. 
To control for analyst herding (e.g., Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2003), we follow 
Conrad et al. (2006) in using MEANREC (mean recommendation changes) for 5 days 
prior to a recommendation change. We also include the previous recommendation level 
(LREC) in the equation, as the higher (lower) the previous recommendation, the less 
(more) room the analyst has to upgrade it. In addition, some analysts may change their 
recommendations for certain practical reasons. For example, some brokerage firms have 
their own explicit stock-valuation models, and require a strict relation between 
recommendation levels and 1-year stock-price targets. If abnormal returns at the time of 
the earnings surprise are sufficiently large, analysts may have to change their 
recommendations to ensure consistency with their firms’ valuation models and internal 
policies. To ascertain the probability of this outcome, we use ABRET, the 10-day 
cumulative average abnormal returns (market-adjusted model) for a firm before a 
recommendation change, as a control variable in the regression model. Prior studies (e.g., 
Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999) have found that analysts with more experience make 
more accurate earnings forecasts. We use the control variable EXP as a proxy for analyst 
experience. Finally, we use BRKSZ to control for the effect of the size of a brokerage 
house or an investment bank, and include firm size (LOGMKV) and institutional holdings 
(INST) as possible proxies for the amount of publicly available information about the 
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firm, because larger firms and firms with larger institutional holdings tend to release 
more information to the public, which facilitates analysts’ recommendations.17 
Our third hypothesis states that the responses of influential analysts to large 
earnings surprises may differ from those of less influential analysts due to reputation 
concerns. More influential affiliated analysts are those employed by more prestigious 
investment banks. To determine whether an affiliated analyst is employed by a 
prestigious or a less prestigious investment bank, we use a binary classification (INFLU) 
based on the investment bank’s market share. INFLU takes a value of 1 if the analyst 
works for one of the top 10 investment banks by market share, i.e., Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Credit Suisse, Lehman Brothers, JP 
Morgan, UBS, Barclay Capital, or Citi, and 0 otherwise. 18 The Carter-Manaster (CM), 
Johnson-Miller, and Ritter rankings are formal systems for ranking investment-bank 
reputation.19 As our main purpose is to examine changes to the recommendations made 
by influential analysts in response to large earnings surprises, rather than to 
comprehensively investigate the effects of investment banks’ reputation on analyst 
recommendations, we follow Fang (2005) in using a binary variable to distinguish 
between prestigious and less prestigious banks.  
We use the following regression equation to test the third hypothesis. The 
regression includes an interaction between three main effects: SURPRISE, AFFIL, and 
INFLU:  
                                                   
17 Our institutional-holdings data are drawn from Thomson Financial/Spectrum. 
18 This list of prestigious investment banks is similar to Fang’s (2005) list, which comprises Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Credit Suisse, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan, 
and DLJ. Note that in August 2000, Credit Suisse acquired DLJ. We add three banks (UBS, Barclay Capital, 
and Citi) to the list based on a recent ranking of investment banks by The Wall Street Journal (October 1, 
2009). Our results do not change significantly if the top 8 or top 15 banks are selected as prestigious banks.  
19  Jay Ritter’s ranking is primarily based on the CM system, and can be accessed at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
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UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 INFLU+ β4 SURPRISE × AFFIL  
+ β5 SURPRISE ×INFLU+β6 INFLU ×AFFIL 
+ β7 SURPRISE × AFFIL ×INFLU+β8 MEANREC6 + β9LREC 
+β10ABRET +β11EXP+β12BRKSZ+β13LOGMKV+β14INST+ε    (2) 
   
We run the regression separately for the large positive and large negative earnings 
surprises samples. The variable of interest is SURPRISE × AFFIL × INFLU. If 
investment bank reputation helps to reduce affiliated analysts’ conflicts of interest (H3), 
we expect β7 >0 for the negative earnings surprises sample.  
The fourth hypothesis concerns the effects of the Global Settlement and other 
regulations on analyst recommendations. We attempt to determine whether the responses 
of affiliated analysts to large earnings surprises have changed since the Global Settlement. 
The regression equation is as follows.  
UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 DREG+ β4 SURPRISE×AFFIL  
  +β5AFFIL×DREG+ β6 SURPRISE× DREG 
+β7 SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG+β8MEANREC  
+ β9LREC+β10ABRET+β11EXP+β12BRKSZ+β13LOGMKV+β14INST+ε  (3)                    
 
Consistent with Kadan et al. (2009), we define DREG as a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if an analyst issues a recommendation report for a firm after September 2002, and 
0 if the recommendation is made before September 2002.20 The month of September 
2002 and beyond comprise the period after the enactment of NYSE Rule 472 and NASD 
Rule 2711. These two rules require investment banks to create and enforce firewalls that 
restrict communication and interaction between investment banking departments and 
research analysts. If the Global Settlement is effective in restoring analyst integrity, we 
expect the coefficient of the interaction variable of SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG in the 
negative earnings surprises group to be significantly positive (β7> 0).  
                                                   
20  Our results do not change qualitatively when (1) January 2003, the first month after the Global 
Settlement was reached, or (2) December 2003, is used as a cutoff to determine the value of DREG.  
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4.3. Descriptive statistics 
We obtain analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendation data from the I/B/E/S 
database and estimate analyst median forecasts based on the Detail History file. We 
obtain data on daily stock returns and firm finances from The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We include only ordinary common 
shares; certificates and depository receipts, foreign firms, closed-end fund shares, and 
real estate investment trusts (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) are excluded.21 Our earliest 
data are drawn from 1994 records, because I/B/E/S recommendation data are only 
available from October 1993. The sample ends in 2005 because it was the last year for 
I/B/E/S database to provide analyst and broker translation files. The information is 
essential in identifying an analyst's employer/broker, from which we are able to 
determine whether an analyst is affiliated or not. Consistent with Mendenhall (2004), we 
delete firm quarters with only one analyst forecast in the group.  
We report the descriptive statistics for the large earnings surprises in Panel A of 
Table 1. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level each year to 
minimize the influence of outliers. The sample consists of 52,862 firm-quarter-analyst 
observations of 7,568 large quarterly earnings surprises (4,591 positive and 2,977 
negative) reported by firms publicly listed in the U.S during the 1994 to 2005 period. As 
shown in Panel A, the mean (median) earnings surprise is 55.9% (32.4%) for the large 
positive earnings surprises group and -119.6% (-74.2%) for the large negative earnings 
surprises group. The standard deviations for large positive and negative surprises groups 
are 62.4% and 120%, respectively. We report the mean values of several financial 
                                                   
21 We also exclude utilities (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 4400 and 4499) and 
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). 
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measures in Panel B. The firms reporting large positive and negative surprises are smaller 
than the firms reporting moderate surprises—the average market capitalization is $1.19 
($0.92) billion for the large positive (negative) surprises sample, compared with more 
than $3.0 billion for the moderate-surprises firms. The large positive (negative) surprises 
sample has an average beta of 1.15 (1.23), and the moderate-surprises samples have beta 
values well below 1.0. The firms with large positive earnings surprises tend to be growth 
firms, as indicated by their smaller book-to-market ratios and higher price-to-earnings 
ratios. The firms with large negative earnings surprises have conspicuously lower growth 
rates (measured by sales and earnings growth) and poorer operating performance than the 
firms that report large positive surprises and moderate surprises, as measured by industry-
adjusted return on equity (ROE).22 Overall, the results in Panel B show that firms with 
large positive surprises, firms with large negative surprises, and the control groups vary 
significantly in terms of firm size, risk, market-perceived growth opportunities, and 
operating profitability. None of these differences are surprising. 
In Panel C of Table 1, we report the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 
earnings surprises samples for various event windows around the quarterly EADs. We 
find that on average, firms with large positive (negative) earnings surprises earn 
significantly positive (negative) risk-adjusted stock returns. The 3-day [-1, +1] market 
model (4-factor model) returns are 2.05% (2.02%) for the positive earnings surprises 
sample and -1.25% (-1.28%) for the negative earnings surprises sample. A similar pattern 
exists for the other event windows. The moderate positive earnings surprises control 
sample has relatively “moderate” stock returns, with significant 3-day [-1, +1] market 
                                                   
22 The industry-adjusted ROE is equal to net income before extraordinary items divided by book value of 
equity, adjusted by industry median ROE. The industry classification is based on Fama-French’s (1993) 
system. 
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model returns of 0.63% and 4-factor adjusted returns of 0.59%. Although the moderate 
negative earnings surprises control sample has significantly negative abnormal returns on 
the trading day after the earnings surprise announcement, the returns are economically 
quite small. The returns presented in Panel C of Table 1 are consistent with previous 
findings on market reactions to firms’ earnings announcements (e.g., Bernard and 
Thomas, 1990; Doyle et al., 2006). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
5.   Empirical Results 
5.1. Univariate test 
 
We present the results of a univariate analysis of the analysts’ responses to large 
earnings surprises in Table 2. The panel shows that the average recommendation made by 
affiliated (unaffiliated) analysts before large positive earnings surprises (RECbefore) is 
3.865 (3.739). This level generally represents a “hold” (3) or “buy” (4) rating. In response 
to large positive earnings surprises, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts increase their 
recommendations. The average recommendation increase for affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts is 0.045 and 0.053, respectively, and the difference is not significant, with a 
bootstrapping p-value smaller than 0.18. 23  The responses to large negative earnings 
                                                   
23 As the distribution of analyst recommendations is non-normal and right-skewed, we report bootstrapped 
p-values rather than conventional t-statistics. Following Hertzel et al. (2002), we perform the bootstrapping 
procedure as follows. First, we calculate the average recommendation levels for affiliated analysts in the 
large positive earnings surprises sample before and after the quarterly EAD, and obtain the difference 
between them (RECafter – RECbefore). We then group the recommendation ratings and randomly select 
recommendation ratings with replacements to construct our first pseudo-sample. Next, we estimate the 
recommendation change for this pseudo-sample as the first mean-difference observation (recommendation 
change). We repeat this procedure 1,000 times to obtain 1,000 observations of pseudo-sample 
recommendation changes. This procedure yields empirical distributions of recommendation changes under 
the null hypothesis of no mean difference. Finally, the null hypothesis is rejected at the α% level if the 
recommendation change for our sample firms is less than the (1-α) percentile recommendation changes in 
the empirical distribution of the pseudo-samples. We apply the same procedure to the large negative and 
moderate earnings surprises samples. 
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surprises are somewhat different. The average recommendation rating made by affiliated 
analysts before large negative earnings surprises is 3.425 (between “hold” and “buy”). 
Although this rating decreases to 3.416 after negative earnings surprises, the decrease is 
not significant. In contrast, the average recommendation made by unaffiliated analysts 
decreases by 0.345 from 3.356 to 3.011 following large negative earnings surprises. This 
decrease is significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with a difference 
between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ behavior following large negative earnings 
surprises, and thus provide preliminary support for the existence of analyst conflicts of 
interest.  
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
5.2. Tests of H1 and H2  
We now turn to the results of an ordered logistic regression of the changes made 
to analysts’ recommendations in response to large earnings surprises. We first report 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression models in Panel A and B of Table 
3. About 15.8% (17.0%) of the recommendation changes are made by affiliated analysts 
in the large positive (negative) surprises sample; 26.7% (28.2%) of the recommendation 
changes are made by influential analysts employed by prestigious investment banks in the 
large positive (negative) surprises sample. More importantly, we do not find any 
significant differences in the means or medians of the major variables across affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts in either the large positive or negative surprises samples. This 
suggests that the potential endogenous determination of analyst affiliation is not a major 
concern in our sample. That is, it does not appear that affiliated analysts are more likely 
to follow a certain type of firm, which might cause systematically different 
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recommendation changes when the firms report large positive or negative earnings 
surprises.  
We present the regression results for Equation (1) in Panel C of Table 3. As 
shown in model (1), for the positive earnings surprises sample, the coefficient of 
SURPRISE is 0.019 (p>0.006), suggesting a direct relationship between the magnitude of 
large positive earnings surprises and the likelihood that unaffiliated analysts will increase 
their stock-recommendation ratings. The key variable used to test the first and second 
hypothesis is SURPRISE×AFFIL. For the large positive earnings surprises sample, the 
coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL is 0.013 (p>0.155), which is not statistically 
significant. Consistent with our first hypothesis, this indicates no significant differences 
in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large 
positive earnings surprises—they are equally likely to upgrade stocks. 
Model (2) shows the regression results for H2. For the negative earnings surprises 
sample, the coefficient of SURPRISE is 0.014 (p>0.007). As a small number indicates a 
larger negative earnings surprise, the result implies that the larger (smaller) a negative 
earnings surprise, the more (less) likely unaffiliated analysts are to lower their stock-
recommendations. The key variable, SURPRISE×AFFIL, has a coefficient of -0.031 
(p>0.005), suggesting that following a large negative earnings surprise, affiliated analysts 
are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade recommendations. To further 
interpret the coefficient for the interaction term of SURPRISE×AFFIL, we follow Wu et 
al. (2015) and estimate the difference in marginal effect with respect to AFFIL for each 
possible level of the UPGRADE (i.e., 1, 0, and -1) for the negative earnings surprises 
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sample. 24 Regarding the probability of recommendation downgrade (UPGRADE = -1), 
the marginal effect is significantly more negative for affiliated analysts than for 
unaffiliated analysts (difference in margin effects = -0.078, p<0.001). Conversely, 
regarding the probability of recommendation upgrade (UPGRADE = 1), the marginal 
effect of analyst affiliation status (AFFIL) for earnings surprises is significantly more 
positive for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts (difference in marginal effects 
= 0.042, p<0.001).25 Collectively, these results are consistent with the findings reported 
in Panel C of Table 3 and provide strong support of H2: affiliated analysts are less likely 
to downgrade stocks subsequent to announcements of large negative earnings surprises.  
The coefficients of the control variables in the regressions (both model (1) and 
(2)) generally have the predicted signs. MEANREC measures analysts’ herding behavior 
(Conrad et al., 2006), and it has a positive and significant coefficient for both positive and 
negative earnings surprise samples. This suggests that the probability of a 
recommendation upgrade (downgrade) is higher if other analysts at the same firm 
upgrade (downgrade) the stock during the prior 10-day period. This result is consistent 
with previous findings on analysts’ herding behavior (Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2003). 
We also find a strong and highly significant negative relation between the probability of 
an upgrade and previous recommendation levels (LREC). This result is consistent with 
our expectations, as there is little or no room to upgrade (downgrade) when previous 
recommendations are already very high (low). The variable ABRET has a significant and 
                                                   
24 The interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear models (such as a logistic regression used here) is 
not quite as simple as in linear models. A significant coefficient for an interaction is not necessarily 
evidence of a significant difference in probabilities across groups. Therefore, following a comment from 
one of our anonymous referees, we report the difference in marginal effects across groups.  
25 Regarding the probability of no change of recommendation (UPGRADE = 0) in response to large 
negative earnings surprises, the marginal effect of analyst affiliation status (AFFIL) for earnings surprises is 
also significantly more positive for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts (difference in marginal 
effects = 0.036, p<0.001) 
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negative coefficient in both samples. This suggests that if the abnormal returns around a 
positive earnings surprise are sufficiently large, an analyst may lower his 
recommendation to ensure its consistency with his valuation model. In contrast, if the 
abnormal returns around a negative earnings surprise are sufficiently low, an analyst may 
have to increase his recommendation to ensure consistency with his valuation model.  
There is a significant positive association between analysts’ research experience 
and recommendation changes: analysts with more experience tend to be more likely to 
make recommendation changes. Experienced analysts may be better able to interpret 
information (e.g., Clement, 1999; Mikhail et al., 1997 and 1999; Cao and Kohlbeck, 
2014). Using the number of analysts employed by a firm as a measure of brokerage size, 
we find that analysts employed by a large brokerage firm or investment bank are more 
likely to upgrade their recommendations following large negative earnings surprises. 
These analysts may suffer more severe conflicts of interest because a large proportion of 
their revenue depends on investment banking (Aggarwal and Chen, 2008). There is also a 
positive relationship between recommendation upgrades and institutional holdings 
(INST). Firms with larger institutional holdings tend to release more information to the 
public, which facilitates analysts’ recommendations.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.3. Test of H3 
 
In this section, we test H3 by determining whether influential and less influential 
affiliated analysts respond differently to large earnings surprises due to the disciplinary 
function of reputation concern. Influential affiliated analysts are those employed by more 
prestigious investment banks. We conduct a regression analysis of the large positive and 
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negative earnings surprises samples separately, and report the results of Equation (2) in 
Table 4. The coefficients of SURPRISE×AFFIL are 0.014 (p>0.160) and -0.022 
(p>0.021) for the large positive and negative earnings surprise samples, respectively. 
These results suggest that for less influential analysts, while there is no significant 
difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts 
following positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are more reluctant than 
unaffiliated analysts to downgrade stock recommendations in response to negative 
earnings surprises. The variable of interest is a three-way interaction term of 
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU. For the large positive earnings surprise sample, the 
coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU is 0.012, and it is not statistically significant 
(p>0.132). This finding implies that the responses of influential and less influential 
affiliated analysts to large positive earnings surprises are similar—they are equally likely 
to upgrade stocks. In contrast, for the negative earnings surprise sample, 
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU has a coefficient of -0.020 and it is statistically significant 
(p>0.038). Further examining the difference in marginal effects across groups for large 
negative earnings surprises firms, we find that with respect to the probability of 
recommendation upgrade (UPGRADE=1), the marginal effect of INFLU for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL is significantly more positive for influential analysts than for less 
influential analysts (difference in marginal effects = 0.038, p<0.001). Conversely, the 
marginal effect of INFLU regarding the probability of recommendation downgrade 
(UPGRADE = -1) is significant more negative for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated 
analysts (difference in margin effects = -0.075, p<0.001). This indicates that following 
large negative earnings surprises, influential affiliated analysts are less likely to 
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downgrade a firm’s stock. These results do not support H3, indicating that reputation 
concern is not an effective mechanism for restoring the integrity of financial analysts.  
Our findings here are in line with those of Fang and Yasuda (2009), who show 
that a bank’s reputation does not effectively mitigate the biased forecasts of analysts with 
conflicts of interest.26 Concern for their personal reputation may give influential analysts 
an even stronger incentive to maintain good relationships with managers, who constitute 
an important source of information for stock research (e.g., Francis et al., 1997; Das et 
al., 1998).  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.4. Test of H4   
 We then proceed to test H4, which concerns the effects of the Global Settlement 
and other regulations on analyst recommendations. Table 5 presents the regression results 
for Equation (3) for both positive and negative earnings surprise samples. We focus on 
whether the responses of affiliated analysts to large earnings surprises have changed since 
the Global Settlement and other relevant rules. DREG measures the main effect of the 
Global Settlement, and it has insignificant coefficient in both models, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of the Global Settlement is not significant in reducing the optimism in 
unaffiliated analysts. The coefficients of SURPRISE×AFFIL are 0.010 (p>0.151) and -
0.026 (p>0.041) for the large positive and negative earnings surprise samples, 
respectively. Consistent with the results reported in previous tables, we find that while 
prior to the Global Settlement, affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are equally likely to 
                                                   
26 Under the Global Settlement, 10 of the largest Wall Street banks paid $1.4 billion to federal regulators to 
settle the charge made by the government that the banks had issued optimistic stock reports to win 
investment banking clients. Jack Grubman, once a top analyst at Salomon Smith Barney, paid millions in 
fines and was banned from the investment industry for life. The involvement of highly regarded analysts 
and banks in the scandal appears to support our findings.  
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upgrade stock recommendations in response to large positive earnings surprises, affiliated 
analysts are more reluctant than their unaffiliated peers to downgrade recommendations 
following large negative earnings surprises. The variable of interest is the interaction 
variable SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG. As shown in Table 5, the coefficients of the 
variables are not statistically significant in either the large positive or large negative 
earnings surprises groups. The coefficients of the other variables are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in Table 3. As this finding indicates little significant change in analysts’ 
reactions subsequent to large earnings surprises after the Global Settlement, our fourth 
hypothesis is not supported. But our results here are in line with Di Lorenzo’s (2007) 
argument that laws do not necessarily determine corporate conduct. Kadan et al. (2009) 
report similar finding; that is, affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic 
recommendations after the Global Settlement.  
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.5. Corroborative evidence on analysts’ dropping coverage and other tests 
 
In the tests reported in Table 3, UPGRADE is scored as 1, 0, or -1. UPGRADE = 
0 indicates that analysts do not alter their recommendations subsequent to large earnings 
surprises. Some analysts may simply drop their coverage, particularly following large 
negative earnings surprises. Therefore, we conduct a further test to determine whether 
analysts are more likely to drop their coverage or to maintain their previous 
recommendations in response to large negative earnings surprises. The regression model 
is similar to that in Equation (1), except that we use a logit model rather than an ordered 
logistic model. The dependent variable DROP is defined as 1 if an analyst drops his 
coverage subsequent to firm large earnings surprises, and 0 if an analyst maintains his 
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previous recommendation or does not provide a recommendation update. In the large 
negative earnings surprises sample, we find 705 cases of analysts’ dropping their 
coverage and 3,655 observations in which no recommendation changes are made. We use 
these observations to conduct the logit regression. The coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL 
is -0.011 (p>0.031), indicating that affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated 
analysts to drop their coverage after a firm reports a large negative earnings surprise. This 
finding provides further support for H2 regarding analysts’ conflicts of interest.27 
We use mean recommendation changes to control for potential herding behavior 
in previous regression models; however, the mean changes are likely to be affected by 
extreme upgrades or downgrades. Alternatively, we use the number of analysts following 
a firm to control for herding behavior. In addition, we control for the number of days 
between the earnings reporting date and the date of analysts’ recommendations. Our main 
results remain consistent after these changes to the model specifications. 28 
5.6. Market reactions to analysts’ recommendation changes 
 
 Panel A of Table 6 presents the stock returns surrounding analysts’ 
recommendation changes. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Womack, 1996), we find a 
significant market response to analysts’ recommendation changes. For the 
recommendation upgrades issued by affiliated (unaffiliated) analysts subsequent to large 
positive earnings surprises, the mean 3-day [-1, +1] 4-factor CARs are 3.60% (3.09%), 
and the differences in returns for affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are insignificant at 
                                                   
27 Due to space limitations, this table is not presented here. It is available from the authors upon request. 
28 We thank one of our referees for these suggestions. The results are not tabulated here to save space; they 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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the 5% level.29 Panels A and B of Figure 2 present the stock returns and abnormal trading 
volume, respectively, around the recommendation changes. We estimate the abnormal 
volume or mean-adjusted volume for the comparison period by subtracting the arithmetic 
mean volume of the jth firm calculated over the estimation period from its volume on day 
t. The estimation period comprises 250 trading days before the event window. We find 
that the market reaction in terms of both stock returns and trading volume is identical for 
recommendation upgrades issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts subsequent to 
large positive earnings surprises. 30  The stock returns following recommendation 
downgrades after large negative earnings surprises are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
We find fairly large negative stock returns for recommendation downgrades. In addition, 
we find that the differences in the returns following downgrades by affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts are insignificant. We plot these returns and abnormal-volume values 
in Panels C and D of Figure 2, which are similar to Panels A and B. Investors do not 
appear to react differently to the recommendation changes issued by affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts subsequent to large positive and negative earnings surprises.  
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Some caution is necessary when interpreting the 3-day CARs around the 
recommendation changes. Approximately 16% of the recommendation changes in our 
sample were made on day 0 or day 1 following an earnings surprise. Earnings surprises 
and recommendation changes may thus confound the measurements of abnormal returns. 
Therefore, we run the regression again after removing observations in which analysts 
                                                   
29 We include stock returns 1 day before the issuance of the analyst’s recommendation report to incorporate 
possible information leakage. 
30 The mean-adjusted abnormal volume is much greater in reaction to unaffiliated upgrade announcements 
than to affiliated upgrade announcements. 
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make recommendation changes 2 days after the earnings announcement; we obtain 
similar significant results.  
Finally, we test whether investors rationally discount or naïvely follow the 
opinions of analysts (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). According 
to the rational-discounting hypothesis, investors fully expect sell-side analysts to be 
subject to potential conflicts of interest, and adjust analysts’ opinions accordingly when 
making investment decisions. As affiliated analysts are likely to be more optimistic in 
their stock recommendations, investors will discount their recommendation upgrades 
(downgrades) more (less) heavily than those of unaffiliated analysts. However, when 
affiliated analysts issue unfavorable stock opinions, rational investors expect these 
opinions to be more valuable because they are expressed despite conflicts of interest. In 
contrast, the naïve-investor hypothesis states that investors do not take analysts’ conflicts 
of interest into account and make investment decisions merely on the basis of analysts’ 
opinions. To examine these hypotheses, we regress abnormal stock returns on analyst 
affiliation while controlling for other variables, as follows. 
CAR = α + β1DRECCHG + β2AFFIL+β3 AFFIL×DRECCHG + β4 SURPRISE 
         +β5EXP+β6BRKSZ+β7LOGMKV+β8INST+β9 DDAYS×DRECCHG+ε (4)   
 
The new variables are defined as follows. 
 
CAR: Cumulative average abnormal returns measured in a [-1, +1]-day 
event window using the market-adjusted model. 
DRECCHG: Dummy variable equal to 1 for an upgrade recommendation for 
firm i at time t subsequent to earnings surprises in quarter q, and 0 
for a downgrade or reiteration. 
DDAYS: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the earliest recommendation is made 
within 7 trading days (0 to 6) of a firm’s quarterly earnings 
announcement, and 0 otherwise.31 
                                                   
31 As a robustness check, we also use DDAYS, the number of trading days after the firm’s quarterly EAD 
when recommendations are made, as an independent variable in the regression equation. This yields similar 
results.  
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The other variables are defined as previously described. We include an interaction 
variable between DDAYS and DRECCHG to test whether the market reacts differently to 
earlier versus later recommendations. We perform separate regression analyses for the 
large positive and negative earnings surprise samples. The rational-discounting 
hypothesis predicts that β3 < 0, and the naïve-investors hypothesis predicts that β3 = 0.  
 We present the regression results for Equation (4) in Panel B of Table 6. For the 
large positive earnings surprises sample, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
DRECCHG is 0.012 (t = 4.35), indicating that recommendation upgrades are associated 
with higher stock returns than recommendation downgrades or reiterations. This finding 
is consistent with the results reported in Table 2. The affiliation dummy variable AFFIL 
and the interaction term AFFIL ×DRECCHG have coefficients of -0.053 (t = -0.91) and -
0.010 (t = -1.34), which are not statistically significant. This suggests that investors 
respond similarly to the recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. We also find negative but insignificant coefficients for the interaction variables 
DDAYS and DRECCHG. This suggests that investors’ reactions to earlier 
recommendations (within 7 trading days of the EAD) are not significantly different from 
their reactions to later recommendations. The results for the large negative earnings 
surprise sample are similar to those obtained using model (2). 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
Financial analysts play a vital role in disseminating information in capital 
markets. Their activities enhance the overall well-being of capital markets, as their 
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reports and recommendations help investors and can be used to monitor managers. 
However, the extent to which analysts fulfil their professional responsibility depends on 
their integrity, a fundamental component of ethical behavior. Using a sample of analysts’ 
recommendation changes in response to earnings surprises, we test four hypotheses 
concerning the causes and prevention of threats to the integrity of financial analysts. We 
find empirical support for the hypotheses that conflicts of interest encountered by 
affiliated analysts reduce their independence and thus their integrity. The 
recommendation responses of affiliated analysts are asymmetric. Specifically, whereas 
there is no significant difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts subsequent to positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are 
more reluctant than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their recommendations or drop 
their coverage of stocks in response to large negative surprises.   
We also predict that the reputation concern of prestigious investment banks and 
the Global Settlement have a disciplinary function in enhancing analysts’ integrity. 
Biased reports in which overvalued stocks are recommended to investors lead to losses, 
which injure the reputation of both financial analysts and investment banks. The Global 
Settlement removed the connection between analysts’ compensation and investment 
banking business, and required firms to limit internal communication and interaction by 
separating their securities-offering departments from their stock-analysis departments to 
mitigate conflicts of interest. However, we find no empirical support for these hypotheses. 
In fact, we find that positively biased recommendations continue to mislead investors, as 
investors often fail to recognize the threat to integrity of conflicts of interest, despite 
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distinguishing between recommendations made by unaffiliated and affiliated financial 
analysts.  
The findings raise further concerns regarding the ethics and standards for the 
professional conduct of financial analysts. Despite the efforts made by regulators and 
organizations of financial analysts (such as the CFA Institute), conflicts of interest in the 
capital market continue to threaten the integrity of financial analysts, who often 
disseminate misleading information through biased recommendations. We advise future 
researchers to investigate more effective mechanisms for disciplining financial analysts 
and encouraging them to retain their integrity when conflicts of interest occur. 
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Appendix A: Analysts’ Recommendations and Earnings Forecasts for New Century 
Financial Corporation Subsequent to Quarterly Earnings Surprises 
 
  Q3:06 Q2:06 Q1:06 Q4:05  
EAD 11/2/2006 8/3/2006 5/4/2006 2/2/2006  
Consensus (Mean) $1.89 $1.85 $1.46 $1.82  
Actual $1.12 $1.81 $1.79 $2.00  
Earnings Surprise -41% -2% 23% 10%  
Recommendations Summary as 
of 3/2007 (delisting week) 12/2006 (one month after Q3:06) 
Strong Buy 0  2   
Buy 1  5   
Hold 7  2   
Underperform 2  0   
Sell 2  1   
Number of Analysts  12  10   
Consensus Rating 3.4 (hold)  2.3 (buy)   
  Earnings Revisions in 12/2006   Q4:06 Q1:07 FY:06  FY:07 
  Upward Revisions   0  0  0  0  
  Downward Revisions    0 0 0 0 
  Earnings Revisions in 3/2007   Q4:06 Q1:07 FY:06  FY:07 
  Upward Revisions   0  0  0  0  
  Downward Revisions   2 1 1 1 
Corporate Event $50 Million Private Placement of Trust Preferred 
Securities on 9/13/2006 
 
$50 Million Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock on 
8/16/2006 
Underwriters Bear, Stearns & Co. and Morgan Stanley were the co-
book running lead managers for the offering, with Stifel 
Nicolaus and Jefferies & Company as co-managers. 
Stock Closing Prices as of 3/14/2007 3/1/2007 12/1/2006 8/1/2006 5/1/2006 
 $0.67 $15.85 $35.71 $44.35 $51.97 
 
Sources: Finance.Yahoo.com and various New Century Financial Corporation 10Q 
forms. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firms with large earnings surprises 
This table provides summary statistics (Panel A), mean values of financial characteristics (Panel B) and stock returns 
(Panel C) for the firms with large earnings surprises. We define earnings surprises as the I/B/E/S actual earnings per 
share for quarter q minus the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the quarterly EAD, scaled by the absolute 
value of analysts’ median forecasts. Following Doyle et al. (2006), we classify earnings surprises into large positive 
and large negative groups using decile portfolios. In Panel B, we report the mean values of several financial measures. 
SIZE is equal to the closing price at the end of June of year t multiplied by the common shares outstanding at the end of 
June of year t. ASSETS denotes item 6 of the Compustat data at the end of the fiscal year. BM, or book-to-market is 
calculated as the book value of equity t-1/the market value of equity t-1, where the book value of equity is the book value 
of the stockholders’ equity (item 216), plus the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35, if 
available), minus the book value of the preferred stock (item 56: preferred stock redemption value; item 10: preferred 
stock liquidating value; or item 130: preferred stock carrying value, in the order of data availability). PE or price to 
earnings is equal to market capitalization: (item 24*item 25)/the earnings before extraordinary items (item 18). SALES 
GROWTH is calculated as Sales t-1/sales t-2 (item 12). EARNIGNS GROWTH is the earnings before extraordinary items: 
t-1/the earnings before extraordinary items t-2 (item 18). ROE is equal to the net income before extraordinary items: item 
123/the book value of equity, adjusted by the industry median ROE. All the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level each year to minimize the influence of outliers. The industry classification is based on a study by Fama and 
French (1993). BETA is calculated by regressing the stock’s daily return on the value-weighted market return using 
ordinary least squares for 100 trading days’ worth of returns data ending on December 31 of year t. In Panel C, the 
event date (quarterly earnings announcement date) is taken from the I/B/E/S Detail file. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for large positive and negative earnings surprises 
 Mean Median SD Min Q1 Q3 Max N 
Large positive  
earnings surprises 0.559 0.324 0.624 0.120 0.216 0.600 4.000 4,591 
Large negative   
earnings surprises -1.196 -0.742 1.200 -7.727 -1.267 -0.516 -0.310 2,977 
 
Panel B: Mean values of financial characteristics of forms with large earnings surprises  
 SIZE 
($ mil.) 
ASSETS 
($ mil.) BM PE 
SALES 
GROWTH 
EARNINGS 
GRWOTH ROE BETA 
Large positive (+) 
earnings surprises 1,187.01 2,065.71 1.12 23.05 67% 40% 5% 1.15 
Large negative (–) 
earnings surprises 918.31 1,023.10 -- -- -37% -6% -4% 1.23 
Moderate earnings 
surprises (+) 3,546.24 4,066.89 1.65 16.04 25% 15% 2% 0.85 
Moderate earnings 
surprises (–) 3,036.78 3,738.78 1.30 15.82 5% -0% 0% 0.72 
 
Panel C: Stock returns of firms with large earnings surprises 
Event 
windows 
Large positive earnings 
surprises (%) 
 Large negative earnings 
surprises (%) 
 Moderate earnings surprises (%) 
              Positive                          Negative 
CAR 
(Market 
Model) 
CAR 
(4-Factor) 
 CAR 
(Market 
Model) 
CAR (4-
Factor) 
 CAR 
(Market 
Model) 
CAR (4-
Factor) 
CAR 
(Market 
Model) 
CAR (4-
Factor) 
-1 0.51*** (10.43) 
0.51*** 
(11.39) 
 -0.92*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.91*** 
(-7.03) 
 0.19*** 
(5.49) 
0.18*** 
(5.66) 
0.14*** 
(4.75) 
0.13*** 
(4.49) 
0 0.85*** (17.43) 
0.82*** 
(18.44) 
 -0.43*** 
(-7.70) 
-0.45*** 
(-7.26) 
 0.28*** 
(8.06) 
0.26*** 
(8.51) 
0.04 
(1.41) 
0.03 
(1.02) 
+1 0.69*** (14.22) 
0.69*** 
(15.42) 
 -0.83*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.84*** 
(-13.71) 
 0.16*** 
(4.56) 
0.15*** 
(4.86) 
-0.10*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.11*** 
(-3.65) 
[-1, +1] 2.05*** (24.29) 
2.02*** 
(26.13) 
 -1.25*** 
(-11.7) 
-1.28*** 
(-12.03) 
 0.63*** 
(10.46) 
0.59*** 
(10.99) 
0.08 
(1.56) 
0.05 
(1.08) 
[-1, +4] 1.76*** (14.71) 
1.70*** 
(15.60) 
 -1.39*** 
(-9.15) 
-1.43*** 
(-9.53) 
 0.54*** 
(6.33) 
0.47*** 
(6.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.55) 
-0.08 
(-1.09) 
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of analysts’ recommendation changes subsequent to large earnings surprises 
In this table, the recommendation changes made by analysts before and after the firm’s quarterly EAD are compared. 
The recommendation changes are calculated as the difference between the most recent recommendation before the 
quarter q EAD (RECbefore) and the very first (or earliest) analyst recommendation subsequent to the quarter q EAD 
(RECafter) but before the next quarter q+1 EAD. For each quarter, we calculate the average recommendation ratings 
before and after large earnings surprises for both the affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, and the difference in the 
analysts’ recommendation changes following large earnings surprises (RECafter – RECbefore). We average the results 
across the sample period. Following previous studies (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999), 
we identify analysts as affiliated if their investment bank (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the recommended 
stock in the past 5 years; (2) was the underwriter of an SEO or bond offering of the recommended stock in the past 2 
years; or (3) acted as an advisor during an M&A deal made by the firm with the recommended stock during the past 3 
years. We obtain the M&A, IPO and SEO data from the SDC’s datasets. As the distribution of analyst 
recommendations is non-normal and right-skewed, we report bootstrapped p-values rather than conventional t-statistics 
in the last column. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
RECbefore 
 
RECafter 
 Recommendation 
change (RECafter – 
RECbefore) 
Recommendation 
change (bootstrapped p 
value) 
Firms with large 
positive earnings 
surprises  
Affiliated analysts 3.865  3.910  0.045***  < 0.01 
Unaffiliated analysts 3.739  3.792  0.053***  < 0.01 
Difference  0.126  0.118  -0.008 < 0.18 
Firms with large 
negative earnings 
surprises 
Affiliated analysts 3.425  3.416  -0.009 < 0.15 
Unaffiliated analysts 3.356  3.011  -0.345*** < 0.01 
Difference 0.069  0.405  0.336*** < 0.01 
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Table 3: Analysis of analyst recommendation changes following large earnings surprises 
Panel A and B present descriptive statistics of main variables used in the regression model for large positive and 
negative earnings surprises samples, respectively. Panel C shows the regression results of testing the first and second 
hypotheses. The regression equation is specified as in Equation (1). The dependent variable, the recommendation 
changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In 
particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation change is an 
upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does not change; and -1 if a recommendation 
change is a downgrade. AFFIL is an indicator variable of affiliated or unaffiliated analysts. We identify an analyst as 
affiliated if her brokerage firm (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the recommended stock in the past 5 years; (2) 
was the underwriter of an SEO or bond offering of the recommended stock in the past 2 years; or (3) advised on an 
M&A deal made by the firm with the recommended stock in the past 3 years. We use the I/B/E/S Broker Code Key to 
combine the recommendation data with the SDC investment banking data. The sample starts from 1994 and ends 2005 
because it was the last year for I/B/E/S database to provide analyst and broker translation files. MEANREC is the 
average recommendation changes for a firm 5 days before a recommendation change. LREC is previous 
recommendation level before a recommendation change. ABRET is 10-day cumulative average abnormal returns 
(market-adjusted model) for a firm before a recommendation change. EXP is analyst experience, measured as the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of prior quarters in which an analyst has issued an earnings-forecast report for 
the firm. BRKSZ is size of a brokerage house, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts 
employed by the brokerage house. LOGMKV is firm size, measured as the logarithm of the market capitalization of 
firm equity. INST is institution ownership, measured as the percentage of a firm’s total outstanding shares held by 
institutional investors. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression analysis for positive earnings surprises sample 
 Full sample Firms covered by affiliated analysts 
Firms covered by  
unaffiliated analysts 
Difference 
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  difference 
Median 
difference 
SURPRISE 0.559 0.324  0.598 0.333 0.548 0.322 0.050 0.011 
AFFIL 0.158 0.000  1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 
INFLU 0.267 0.000  0.274 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.013 0.000 
MEANREC 0.041 0.000  0.044 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.005 0.000 
LREC 3.596 4.000  3.651 4.000 3.582 4.000 0.069 0.000 
ABRET 0.013 0.011  0.018 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.004 
LOGEXP 2.685 2.651  2.675 2.639 2.688 2.657 -0.013 -0.018 
LOGBRKSZ 3.518 3.590  3.535 3.601 3.502 3.584 0.033 0.017 
LOGMKV 7.450 7.354  7.301 7.276 7.569 7.496 -0.268 -0.220 
INST 0.429 0.309  0.444 0.336 0.411 0.301 0.033 0.035 
DREG 0.385 0.000  0.380 0.000 0.389 0.000 -0.009 0.000 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics for main variables used in the regression for negative earnings surprises sample 
 Full sample Firms covered by affiliated analysts 
Firms covered by  
unaffiliated analysts 
Difference 
 Mean  Median  Mean Median Mean  Median Mean difference 
Median 
difference 
SURPRISE -1.196 -0.743  -1.270 -0.750 -1.175 -0.739 -0.095 -0.011 
AFFIL 0.170 0.000  1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 
INFLU 0.282 0.000  0.292 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.024 0.000 
MEANREC -0.123 0.000  -0.137 0.000 -0.113 0.000 -0.024 0.000 
LREC 3.358 3.000  3.396 3.000 3.347 3.000 0.049 0.000 
ABRET -0.015 -0.011  -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 
LOGEXP 2.521 2.405  2.554 2.434 2.506 2.395 0.048 0.039 
LOGBRKSZ 3.228 3.332  3.262 3.401 3.217 3.332 0.045 0.069 
LOGMKV 7.058 6.896  6.888 6.772 7.107 6.956 -0.219 -0.184 
INST 0.434 0.215  0.489 0.230 0.425 0.203 0.064 0.027 
DREG 0.349 0.000  0.351 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.013 0.000 
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Panel C: Regression analysis of H1 and H2 
 
 
Large positive earnings surprise 
observations 
Model (1) 
 Large negative earnings surprise 
observations 
Model (2) 
 Coefficient  Pr > chi-square  Coefficient  Pr > chi-square 
SURPRISE 0.019*** 0.006  0.014*** 0.007 
AFFIL 0.135 0.104  0.112** 0.041 
SURPRISE×AFFIL 0.013 0.155  -0.031*** 0.005 
MEANREC 0.177*** < 0.001  0.329*** < 0.001 
LREC -0.022*** 0.005  -0.043*** 0.005 
ABRET -0.202* 0.061  -0.129* 0.059 
EXP 0.046*** 0.002  0.067*** <0.001 
BRKSZ 0.077 <0.121  0.015* 0.062 
LOGMKV 0.013 0.138  0.018 0.126 
INST 0.006* 0.058  0.007* 0.063 
N 33,084   19,778  
Log likelihood -36,224.55 *** <0.001  -24,463.91 *** <0.001 
Incremental marginal effect  of AFFIL for 
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=-1) -0.015 
  -0.078*** 
Incremental marginal effect  of AFFIL for 
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=+1) 0.006 
  0.042*** 
Incremental marginal effect  of AFFIL for 
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=0) 0.009 
  0.036*** 
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Table 4: Analyst recommendation changes and reputation concern 
This table displays the results of testing the recommendation changes made by influential affiliated analysts following 
large earnings surprises. The regression equation is specified as in Equation (2). The dependent variable, the 
recommendation changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more 
(less) optimistic. In particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation 
change is an upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does not change; and -1 if a 
recommendation change is a downgrade. To determine whether an affiliated analyst is employed by a prestigious or a 
less prestigious investment bank, we use a binary classification (INFLU) based on the investment bank’s market share. 
INFLU takes a value of 1 if an analyst works for one of the top 10 investment banks by market share, and 0 otherwise. 
Other variables are defined as in Table 3. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Large positive earnings surprise 
observations 
Model (1) 
 Large negative earnings surprise 
observations 
Model (2) 
 Coefficient  Pr > chi-square 
 Coefficient  Pr > chi-square 
SURPRISE 0.011** 0.024  0.014*** 0.006 
AFFIL 0.115 0.165  0.107** 0.030 
INFLU 0.060* 0.088  0.019** 0.040 
SURPRISE×AFFIL 0.014 0.160  -0.022** 0.021 
SURPRISE×INFLU 0.010 0.137  -0.019* 0.057 
INFLU×AFFIL 0.014 0.144  -0.011* 0.085 
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU 0.012 0.132  -0.020** 0.038 
MEANREC 0.153*** < 0.001  0.131*** < 0.001 
LREC -0.020*** < 0.001  -0.048*** <0.001 
ABRET -0.108* 0.052  -0.147*** 0.002 
EXP 0.036*** <0.001  0.051*** <0.001 
BRKSZ 0.060 <0.137  0.032** 0.023 
LOGMKV 0.009 0.180  0.012 0.109 
INST 0.005* 0.052  0.006* 0.070 
N 33,084   19,778  
Log likelihood -34,297.76*** <0.001  -26,284.81*** < 0.001 
Incremental marginal effect  of INFLU for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=-1) -0.013 
  -0.075*** 
Incremental marginal effect  of INFLU for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=+1) 0.005 
  0.038*** 
Incremental marginal effect  of AFFIL for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=0) 0.008 
  0.037*** 
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Table 5: Regression analysis of effects of Global Settlement on analysts’ recommendation changes in response to 
large earnings surprises 
This table displays the results of a regression analysis of the effects of the Global Settlement on analysts’ 
recommendation changes in response to large earnings surprises. The regression equation is defined as in Equation (3). 
The dependent variable, the recommendation changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s 
recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on 
three values: 1 if a recommendation change is an upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation 
does not change; and -1 if a recommendation change is a downgrade. DREG is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if analyst j issues a recommendation report for firm i after the Global Settlement (after September 2002) and 0 if the 
recommendation is made before the Global Settlement. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. The symbols ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Positive large earnings surprises sample 
 Negative large earnings surprises 
sample  
Independent variables Coefficient  Pr > chi-square  Coefficient  Pr > chi-square 
SURPRISE 0.012** 0.039  0.021** 0.017 
AFFIL 0.124 0.144  0.130* 0.060 
DREG 0.012 0.196  -0.062 0.114 
SURPRISE×AFFIL 0.010 0.151  -0.026** 0.041 
AFFIL×DREG 0.063 0.128  -0.045 0.180 
SURPRISE×DREG 0.009 0.197  -0.010 0.166 
SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG -0.044 0.141  0.014 0.211 
MEANREC 0.190*** < 0.001  0.319*** < 0.001 
LREC -0.031*** 0.004  -0.045*** <0.001 
ABRET -0.210*** <0.001  -0.120*** 0.003 
EXP 0.050*** 0.002  0.139*** <0.001 
BRKSZ 0.084 <0.121  0.089* 0.060 
LOGMKV 0.012 0.160  0.029** 0.030 
INST 0.006* 0.091  0.007** 0.043 
N 33,084   19,778  
Log likelihood -19,342.41*** <0.001  -11,841.62*** < 0.001 
Incremental marginal effect  of DREG for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=-1) -0.012 
  -0.014 
Incremental marginal effect  of INFLU for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=+1) 0.007 
  0.006 
Incremental marginal effect  of AFFIL for 
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=0) 0.005 
  0.008 
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Table 6: Stock returns around recommendation changes subsequent to large earnings surprises 
This table displays the stock returns following analysts’ recommendation changes subsequent to large positive and 
large negative earnings surprises, calculated using an event-study methodology. “Event” is defined as a change in 
recommendation, and event dates are drawn from the I/B/E/S files. Changes in recommendations comprise upgrades, 
downgrades and no-changes (no-changes are not reported in the table). The event window is specified as [-1, +1]. We 
accumulate returns from day -1 to capture the effect of a potential earnings information leakage on stock prices (Patell 
and Wolfson, 1984). In addition to the raw returns, we use (1) the market model, (2) the market-adjusted model and (3) 
the Fama-French 3 factor and momentum model as benchmarks. We report our returns for the affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts separately, in addition to the differences in stock returns for affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the results of regressing the abnormal stock returns on the analysts’ 
recommendation changes. The equation is defined as in Equation (4). The dependent variable CAR is defined as 
cumulative average abnormal returns measured in a [-1, +1] event window using the market-adjusted model (returns 
are converted from digits to percentages by multiplying their values by 100). DRECCHG Dummy variable equal to 1 
for an upgrade recommendation for firm i at time t subsequent to earnings surprises in quarter q, and 0 for a downgrade 
or reiteration. DDAYS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the earliest recommendation is made within 7 trading days (0 
to 6 days) subsequent to the firm’s quarterly earnings announcement, and 0 otherwise. The symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Stock returns following recommendation changes after large earnings surprises 
  Raw returns 
CAR 
(market 
model) 
CAR (market 
adjusted model) 
CAR (4-
factor 
model) 
Large 
positive  
earnings 
surprises 
 
Recommendation 
changes – 
upgrade  
 
Affiliated  
 
4.01%*** 3.62%*** 3.93%*** 3.60%*** 
(7.70) (6.35) (7.39) (8.12) 
Unaffiliated 
 
3.47%*** 3.15%*** 3.34%*** 3.09%*** 
(9.35) (6.14) (6.31) (8.16) 
Difference 0.54%* 0.47% 0.59% 0.51% (1.65) (1.26) (1.44) (1.47) 
Recommendation 
changes –
downgrade  
 
Affiliated  
 
-1.83%*** -2.24%*** -2.19%*** -2.22%*** 
(-6.27) (-9.15) (-8.75) (-5.00) 
Unaffiliated 
 
-2.40%*** -2.82%*** -2.80%*** -2.72%*** 
(-15.24) (-22.43) (-22.60) (-12.25) 
Difference  0.57% 0.58% 0.61% 0.50% (1.58) (1.49) (1.52) (1.61) 
      
Large 
negative 
earnings 
surprises 
 
Recommendation 
changes – 
upgrade  
 
Affiliated  
 
1.82%*** 1.36%*** 1.93%*** 1.71%*** 
(4.54) (3.61) (12.23) (4.82) 
Unaffiliated  
 
2.48%*** 2.02%*** 1.72%*** 2.17%*** 
(10.38) (12.76) (7.70) (14.30) 
Difference -0.66% -0.66% 0.21% -0.46% (-1.61) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.59) 
Recommendation 
changes –
downgrade  
 
Affiliated  
 
-6.83%*** -6.90%*** -6.83%*** -6.93%*** 
(-7.11) (-5.54) (-6.30) (-7.22) 
Unaffiliated 
 
-5.82%*** -6.00%*** -5.42%*** -6.09%*** 
(-8.30) (-5.24) (-7.30) (-7.10) 
Difference  -1.01%* -0.90% -1.41% -0.84% (-1.88) (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.60) 
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Panel B: Results of regressing abnormal stock returns on analysts’ recommendation changes 
 
 Model (1) 
Large positive earnings  
surprise sample 
 Model (2) 
Large negative earnings  
surprise sample 
Independent variables  Coefficient t - statistics  Coefficient  t - statistics 
DRECCHG  0.012*** 4.35  0.014*** 4.07 
AFFIL  -0.053 -0.91  -0.089 -1.48 
AFFIL×DRECCHG  -0.010 -1.34  0.021 1.27 
SURPRISE  0.022*** 3.05  -0.002** -2.27 
EXP  0.025 1.59  0.018 1.38 
BRKSZ  0.006** 2.75  0.004 0.98 
LOGMKV  -0.002 -0.25  -0.001 -0.14 
INST  -0.021*** -5.42  -0.025*** -3.47 
DRECCHG×DDAYS  -0.005 -1.21  0.007 0.51 
N  25,465   15,663  
Adjusted R2  0.09   0.10  
 52 
Figure 1: Timeline of events – analysts’ recommendations change following large earnings surprises 
 
This figure illustrates the timeline of events examined in the study. We begin by identifying each firm’s 
EAD for quarter q from the Compustat quarterly file. We take the most recent recommendation before the 
quarter q EAD as the recommendation before the earnings surprise, or RECbefore. This recommendation may 
be made either after the firm’s quarter q fiscal period (illustrated by a solid arrow) or during the quarter q 
fiscal period (illustrated by a dotted arrow). We choose the latest analyst recommendation. We then take 
the very first (or earliest) analyst report (recommendation rating) subsequent to the earnings announcement 
for quarter q (RECafter) to examine the changes in the analysts’ recommendations in response to the 
earnings surprises reported in quarter q (RECafter – RECbefore). To investigate investors’ reactions to analysts’ 
earnings revisions and recommendation changes, we examine the abnormal stock returns and trading 
volume for 3-day event windows centered on the recommendation changes [-1, +1] using the market model, 
the market-adjusted model and the Fama-French 3 factor and momentum model (Carhart, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EAD for quarter q First (earliest) 
recommendation or RECafter 
subsequent to quarter q EAD 
but before q+1 EAD 
 
Quarter q 
fiscal period 
EAD for quarter q+1 
Market reactions [-1, +1] 
Most recent 
recommendation before 
quarter q EAD, or RECbefore 
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Figure 2: Market reactions to stock recommendation changes following large earnings surprises 
This figure plots the market reactions (abnormal stock returns and trading volumes) to changes in the 
recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large earnings surprises for 41 days [-20, 
+20] centered on the recommendation change event date. The CAR values are calculated using the market-
adjusted model (CRSP value weighted index). Abnormal volumes are comparison period mean adjusted 
volumes, and are determined by subtracting the arithmetic mean volume of the stock of the jth firm 
calculated over the estimation period
jVˆ  from its volume on day t. The estimation period comprises 250 
trading days before the event window. 
 
Panel A: Market reactions to affiliated analysts’ 
recommendation upgrades following large 
positive earnings surprises 
 
 
 
Panel C: Market reactions to affiliated analysts’ 
recommendation downgrades following large 
negative earnings surprises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Market reactions to unaffiliated 
analysts’ recommendation upgrades following 
large positive earnings surprises 
 
 
 
Panel D: Market reactions to affiliated analysts’ 
recommendation downgrades following large 
negative earnings surprises 
 
 
 
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Trading Day Relative to Recommendation Event Day [-20, +20]
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
ns
 
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
M
ea
n 
A
dj
us
te
d 
V
ol
um
es
 
-14.00%
-12.00%
-10.00%
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Trading Day Relative to Recommendation Event Day [-20, +20]
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
ns
 
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
M
ea
n 
A
dj
us
te
d 
V
ol
um
es
 
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Trading Day Relative to Recommendation Event Day [-20, +20]
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
ns
 
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
M
ea
n 
A
dj
us
te
d 
V
ol
um
es
 
-12.00%
-10.00%
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Trading Day Relative to Recommendation Event Day [-20, +20]
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
ns
 
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
140.00%
160.00%
180.00%
M
ea
n 
A
dj
us
te
d 
V
ol
um
es
 
